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IV

THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990:

A SOLUTION OR A PROBLEM?

I.

Overview

The signing of the Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990, Public
Law 101-380, (OPA '90) on August 18, 1990 was a significant
landmark

in

the

struggle

to

control

pollution

by

oil

and

the

activities associated with the recovery, transport, and refinement
of oil and associated products in the territorial waters of the United
States, and was long overdue.

The aftermath of the Exxon

Valdez

spill, which was the impetus that finally prodded Congress to pass
the oil spill legislation that had been under consideration for years,
has been filled with controversy over how the spill occu rred. how
the clean up was handled, how the payment of compensation to the
victims involved will be handled, environmental damage, and the
question of how safe are these tankers that are daily operating in
U.S . waters.

All agreed that the situation with regard to oil spills

and oil transport as existed under U.S. law prior to the passage of
OPA '90 was untenable and had to be modified.

The question

remains, however, as to whether OPA '90 as currently written is the
solution that was required or not.

As with all legislation that is

concerned with preventing damage to the environment and with
correcting the damage that does occur, there will be costs to
society that will have to be incurred

to carry out these programs.

These costs may be viewed as being applied to a specific industry or
industries, as in this case the oil industry and the related portion of
1

the

shipping industry involved with the transport of oil and oil

products, but eventually society as a whole pays a portion of these
costs, either in the form of higher prices, lost jobs, higher taxes,
lower return on capital investment, or in damage to the environment.
This paper is a discussion

of provisions of OPA '90, whether this

was sound legislation or a hurried response to a public outcry,

the

possible effects of OPA '90 on the shipping industry and oil industry
as well as related industries, and some proposals on where OPA '90
needs to be amended and how to best induce cooperation and
compliance from the shipping and oil industries.

As this is an

ongoing issue with new facts and details coming to light almost
daily, this paper will be restricted to the state of events as of
September 1991.

II. Background
A. What caused OPA '90 to come about.
1. Recent History of Oil Spills:
Oil is the fuel of modern industry.

The Western industrialized

nations are heavily dependant on oil imported from the oil producing
nations, particularly from the members of the OPEC cartel.

The

primary method of transporting the oil is by tanker, since many of
the

industrialized

nations of

the

available supply of oil close at hand.

world

do

not have a readily

Even nations such as the United

States, with a large supply of indigenous oil, imports up to fifty
percent of its oil requirements from other nations simply because
the foreign oil is cheaper than many of the domestic sources .

In

addition, the United States transports 25 per cent of its domestic

2

production' by tanker from the Alaskan port of Valdez, the terminus
of the Trans-Alaskan Oil Pipeline, to other U. S. ports.

The Global

2000 Report to the President of the United States by the United
States Council on Environmental Quality (1980) estimated that there
would be a 3.3 to 4.4 percent annual increase in the demand for oil.
The first tanker (a ship carrying oil in tanks as opposed to
barrels)

was

built

in

1885, and

crossed the Atlantic in 1911 .

the

first

diesel-powered

ship

These developments, while a boon to

world shipping, were also the beginning of oil pollution at sea as
ships switched from coal as a fuel, which was not a serious threat
to the oceans, to oil, which definitely was.

Evidence of oil pollution

along European coasts was becoming widespread during World War I,
mostly due to shipping lost as a result of the war.

A recent article

in IMQ News stated that in 1928, according to the Financial

Times

of London, 500,000 barrels of oil a year were being dumped into the
sea by ships, mostly as a result of routine operations.s
Oil and petroleum-related products are shipped principally by
sea due to the relatively inexpensive costs per ton of water-borne
transport.

This includes transport by barge along coastal waters, as

opposed to pipelines, rail or truck.
barges, both

Water pollution from tankers and

as a result of accidental spills and from routine

discharges during normal operations is estimated to be at a level of
2.13

million

metric tons per year. 3

Accidental oil spills are

, "Key sections of Alaskan Pipeline are rusting:..... , The New York Times, April 1,1990.
2 IMO News, No.3, 1990, pg 6.
3. Bill Shaw, Brenda Winslett, & Frank Cross. "The Global Environment: A Proposal to
Eliminate Marine Oil Pollution", Natural Resources Journal, Winter 1987, pg 162 163.
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believed to account for approximately 25 per cent of this total.s
Until relatively recently oil spills and operational discharges were
considered to be of minor impact and little attention was paid to the
effects of this pollution.
public

attention

to

Since the Torrey Canyon
oil

spills

and

their

disaster in 1967

effects

has

grown,

culminating in the United States with the outcry that followed the
string of spills in 1989 starting with the Exxon Valdez
(March); the World Prodigy

in Alaska

in Narragansett Bay (June); a tug and

barge in the Houston Ship Channel (June);

and the Presidente Rivera

in the Delaware River (June) ; as well as the February 1990 spill by
the American

Trader

off the shore of Huntington Beach, California.

These spills, combined with the growing concern over water quality
in the wake of rising public outcry over such issues as plastic waste
at sea and the discovery of medical waste on beaches, finally
prodded Congress into action and produced OPA '90.
Operational discharges while on the high seas are a serious
problem and als o need to be dealt with, but the most notorious oil
spills have occurred in or near coastal waters and the effects of a
spill

in

these

waters

are

nothing

short

of

devastating

to

the

environment. The United States suffers about 7,000 spills per year ,
and about 1,000 of these are serious. s
not at the level of the Exxon

1978 Amoco Cadiz
Exxon Valdez

Valdez

While most of these are

incident (to say nothing of the

disaster that was over six times the size of the

spill or of the IXTOC #1 blowout that was eleven

4. Ibid, pg 59.
5. E. Badolato, "Learning From the Exxon Valdez", U,$. Nayal Institute Proceedings,
October 1989, pg 110.
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times the size of Exxon Valdez), the effect on the local environment
of even a relatively small spill such as the barge Florida

in

Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts in 1969 can still be both wide ranging
and pervasive.

George Hampson of Woods Hole Oceanographic
spill the effects

Institute noted that twenty years after the Florida
on the local environment can still be clearly seen. s

The cost to

society of these spills is tremendous , both in monetary terms (the
Amoco Cadiz

spill cost $30 million in 1978 to clean up,?

while the

clean up may be as high as $2

last estimate on the Exxon Valdez

billion on top of the recent settlement for just over $1 billion for
fines!) as well as damage to the environment, the cost of which is
still

understood but will certainly grow as our

not completely

knowledge about the long-term effects of oil spills increases.

2.

Rational

or

reactionary

legislation?

Congress had been struggling with the issue of oil pollution
since the passage of the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act in
1970.

Congress has made several attempts over the last fifteen

years to pass a comprehensive oil spill bill and create a uniform
national program. s

Passage of the legislation by the Senate proved

to be the stumbling block for these bills.
Prior to the Exxon Valdez
attempting

to

ratify

the

incident the emphasis had been on

1984

Protocols

to

the

International

6. Presentation to the University of Rhode Island Marine Affairs Seminar, November 6,
1990.
7. Shaw et al, "The Global Environment..", pg 158.
8. T. Wagner, "The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: An Analysis", Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce, Vol. 21, No.4, October 1990, pg 571.
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Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) and the
International Convention for the Establishment of an International
Fund for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund), a position strongly endorsed by
the

Commandant of the

Coast Guard? , Admiral Kime .

These

Protocols, (discussed in detail in section II.C) would have together
provided a maximum of approximately $260 million compensation
per incident for the cleanup of oil spills and to the victims of these
spills, above and beyond the coverage provided by the vessels'
rnsurance.tv

The Coast Guard had been the U.S. representative to the

International Maritime Organization (IMO) conference on the 1984
Protocols and had consulted closely with Congress as to the major
domestic objectives that needed to be met during the conterence.t '
In fact, the original wording of the Protocols were negated at the
direction of the Senate, and concessions were made to the U.S.
position

(principally to raise the

limits of compensation to the

present level) with the understanding that the U.S. would ratify then
the

Protocols .tv

When the U.S.

failed to do so, we were seen as

having negotiated in bad faith and as such having little creditability
(or leverage) in future negotiations.
A major point of contention during debate over the Protocols in
Congress had been the issue of preemption of states authority to
impose regulations and liabilities.

The majority of these objectives

9. U.S. Congress, House, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Coast Guard and
Navigation Sub-Committee, Future of the U. S. Coast Guard, Hearing , June 1990. pg

68.
10. U.S. Congress, House, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Coast Guard and
Navigation Sub-Committee. Inyestigation into Coastal Ojl Spills, Hearing, June 21,
1990, pg 4.
11. Wagner. pg 572.
12. Inyestigation into Coastal Oil Spills. pg 6.
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were met, but the Senate still would not ratify the Protocols after
they had been submitted by the Reagan Administration.

The refusal

of the Senate to budge on this issue of preemption is an unfortunate
case

of

short-sighted

politics,

as

without

the

international

Protocols in force, a jUdgement by a U.S. court cannot reach a foreign
corporation unless that company has assets in the U.S., as the U.S.
has no agreements with any other country to
judgement. 13

enforce such a

If a vessel was not bound for a U.S. port but was only

proceeding in innocent passage through U.S. waters, the U.S. would
not have jurisdiction to take the owner of the ship to court in the
event of an accident.

Admiral Kime had recommended adoption of

the Protocols as they contained specific language that would make a
lawsuit settled in a U.S . court binding in both the flag state of the
vessel that caused the spill as well as the country where the
insurance policy for the vessel was written, so long as all of the
states were party to the Protocols. 14

Settlement of many claims

under the Protocols have been processed without litigation. 15
would be far more preferable than a case such as the Torrey
spill,

where the

owner simply walked away from

leaving the victims with no legal recourse.
legislation

during

the

next

three

sessions

the

This

Canyon

disaster

The House passed
that

would

implemented the Protocols but the Senate still refused to act.

have
The

oil industry wanted one unified code of oil pollution legislation to

13. U.S. Congress, House, Public Works and Transportation Committee, Water
Resources Subcommittee, Oil Spill Liability and Compensation, Hearing, June 28,
1989,pg 79 - 80.
14. Inyestigation into Coastal Oil Spills, 26 - 27.
15. OJ! Spill Liability and Compensation, pg 40 . 41.
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deal with but the states want to maintain their rights to control
their local waters, and the Senate leadership would not budge.

Exxon

Valdez

The

disaster was the impetus for moving the debate

forward towards a resolution.
The original bill that was introduced to the 101st session of
Congress as H.R. 1465 was substantially altered when it was finally
passed and signed into law as OPA '90.

State law was not preempted

(the major objection of the Senate to previous legislation) and the
international

protocols

recommendations,

given

were
by

not
many

implemented.
agencies,

These

including

the

Commandant of the Coast Guard and the State Department, in
testimony before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, were ignored in the effort to pass a comprehensive bill.
OPA '90, which was drafted as a comprehensive bill to prevent and
clean up oil spills,

goes on to detail a myriad of activities , such as

the requirement for double hulls on tankers, the establishment of oil
spill

response teams,

installation of Vessel Traffic Systems

in

various ports, and so on. Most importantly, the liability limits are
much higher than would be available under the Protocols, and a $1
billion Oil Spill Compensation Fund was created, in recognition of
the fact that a spill such as the Exxon

Valdez

would cause damage

that would require an extensive (and expensive) clean up. OPA '90
was

a political compromise

passed to satisfy the call to do

something, not to solve a major problem with

B.

a rational solution.

Review of specific provisions of OPA '90
1. New regulations:
8

Genera./..;,

The passage of OPA '90 has resulted in a number of

significant changes

to

transport and oil spills .

national

concerned

regulations

with

oil

The law finally consolidated the various,

often conflicting pieces of legislation that previously were used to
prevent oil spills and determine liability in the event of an oil spill.
OPA '90 did not preempt state laws nor did it implement any
international oil spill conventions.
include

liability,

compensation

Areas covered under OPA '90
for

damages

prevention, removal of a spill, and penalties for

from

an

oil

spill,

failure to comply

with the new regulations concerning oil spills .
The legislation that was superceded or amended by OPA '90
included the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (FWPCA),
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 (TAPA), the
Deepwater Ports Act of 1974 (DPA) and the Outer-Continental Shelf
Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (OCSLA) .
Liability: OPA '90 imposes strict, joint and several liability
for removal costs and damages upon each responsible party for
discharge of oil from vessels and facilities into navigable waters,
onto

adjoining

shorelines,

or

into

waters

economic zone of the United States.' 6

within

the

exclusive

Strict liability means that a

polluter who causes a discharge to occur is found to be at fault,
unless it can be shown that the discharge was completely due to an
act outside of the control of the owner, such as an act of God or of
war.

The owner then is completely responsible to pay for the clean

up costs . Joint and several liability means that if there are several

16.

OPA 1990, section 1002(a}
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polluters,

or several owners of a vessel (this can

include the

operator and a charterer of a vessel as well as the owner in fact),
each one is responsible

for the damages caused and will pay their

proportionate share of the costs to alleviate those damages. The
responsible party for a vessel is defined as the owner, operator or
demise charterer.!?

Damages that may be included in claims are:

- Damage to natural resources
- Damage to real or personal property
- Loss of subsistence use
- Loss of government revenues and taxes
- Loss of profits and earning capacity
- Costs of increased or additional public services 1 8
The new limits of statutory liability and removal costs under
OPA '90 are as follows:
(1) the greater of $1,200 per gross ton or $10 million for
tank vessels of more than 3,000 tons;
(2) the greater of $1,200 per gross ton or $2 million for
tank vessels of less than 3,000 gross tons;
(3) the greater of $600 per gross ton or $500,000 for all
other vessels;
(4) $75 million, plus removal costs, for offshore
facilities;
(5) $350 million for onshore facilities and deepwater
ports .I ?

17. OPA 1990, section 1001
18. OPA 1990, section 1002(b)(2)
19. OPA 1990. section 1002(b)
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There

is

no

limitation

of

liability

if

the

incident

was

proximately caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct, or by
a violation of a federal safety, construction or operation regulation
by the responsible party, its agent, employee or person acting
pursuant to a contract with the responsible party.20 Also, there is
no limitation if the responsible party "refuses or fails" to report the
incident,

to

responsible

provide
official,

reasonable
or

to

without sufficient cause .21

comply

assistance
with

certain

requested
FWPCA

by

a

orders

The House version (H.R. 1465) originally

had provisions for Oil Cargo Owner Liability, which would have made
the

cargo

owner

secondarily

liable

(after

the

vessel

owner/charterer) for the cost of damages as the result of a spil1. 22
This provision caused quite a bit of concern for -the major oil
companies as this would have required them to have to screen the
safety record of the vessel carrying their oil , and to obtain coverage
in the event of a spill.

The House felt that this would have been a

strong incentive for cargo owners to use high-grade transporters 23
and therefore would have been useful in reducing the risk of an oil
spill, but the Senate did not agree. The assessment of risk is fairly
straight forward, as a cargo owner would only have to check with
Lloyd's Register of Shipping to determine what sort of risk a vessel
represented, and he would have had a reasonable idea of what sort of
risks he was taking.

This provision was not included in the belief

that ownership of the oil would be too difficult to determine, as oil
20 . OPA 1990, section 1004(c)(2)
21. OPA 1990, section 1004(c}(2)
22. H.R. 1465, section 1002, 101st Congress, First Session, November 15, 1989.
23. Oil Spill Liabjlity and Compensation, pg 167.
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is often bought and sold several times during the voyage from the oil
field to the

refinery.

This failure to divide the

responsibility

between operator and cargo owner is a serious mistake as there is
nothing to induce a cargo owner to use a quality vessel as opposed to
a one-ship "cowboy" corporation that has no assets in the event of a
spill to risk, and so takes only the very minimal precautlons.efinancial Responsibility:

Operators of vessels over 300 tons

entering the Exclusive Economic Zone of the U.S. are to be able to
prove

financial security to at least cover the maximum liability

requirements under section 1004 of OPA '90. 2 5

This may be by a

certificate of financial responsibility issued by a P & I club, a
surety bond, or some other proof of sufficient resources.

Failure to

comply with this provision can result in a fine as described below,
and may result in the denial of entry or detention of the vessel and
the vessel and oil carried as cargo will be subject to seizure and
forfeiture.
Compensation:

OPA '90 also provides for funds to be available

for payment of pollution damages and for the costs of removal,
assessment, restoration and operational activities from the Oil Spill
Liability

Trust Fund, which

was

established under the

Internal

Revenue Code as a five cents per barrel tax on oil imported into the
U.S .26

The Fund will be built up to a level of $1 billion, and will

also be available for payment of claims that are not covered by the
24. Editorial, Marine Log, December 1990, pg 3.
25. OPA 1990, section 1016.
26. OPA 1990, section 1012(a)
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responsible parties' liability coverage.
Prevention:

Provisions of OPA '90 dealing with prevention of

oil spills include alcohol and drug testing, removal of the ship's
master if he is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, access to the
Register

applicants

National

Driver

for

manning

standards for vessels,

vessel

for

mariner licenses,

traffic service systems,

establishment of a double hull requirement for tankers, and other
measures dealing with vessel safety devices and operation. 2 7
Removal

Responsibilities:

In the wake of the confusion

surrounding the procedures for coordination of the clean up effort
for the Exxon

Valdez

spill, provisions were

responsibility for the clean up.

made

to clarify

The President is now required to

"ensure effective and immediate removal" of a spill, direct and
monitor all federal, state and private actions as well as remove and
destroy a vessel that is discharging or threatening a discharge. 2 8
OPA '90 also directs the National Contingency Plan for a worst-case
oil spill be revised, that a "national response unit" and ten Coast
Guard District response groups be created, and the preparation of
area, facility and vessel response plans. 2 9
OPA '90 and the amendments that it causes to the FWPCA do
not, however, expressly provide that the discharger must undertake
removal activities .

He may be obligated to remove the spill by the

President or face severe penalties (discussion to follow) but the
statutory basis for this is not explicit.s ?
27.
28.
29.
30.

OPA 1990, Title IV.
OPA 1990, section 4201 .
OPA 1990, sections 4201 (b) and 4202.
Wagner, pg 576.
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Penalties:
for

oil

spill

The criminal and civil penalties provided by OPA '90
related

acts

are

substantially

administrative penalty authority is created
Transportation and the EPA Administrator.
- Imprisonment of

not

more than

increased

in the

and

Secretary of

Penalties include:
three

years

(five

if a

subsequent conviction) and a fine of not more than $250,000 for
failure to notify the appropriate federal agency of a spill.
- $10 ,000 fine

per violation,

not to

exceed $25,000 for

multiple violations (Class I penalty) or $10,000 fine per violation,
not to exceed $125,000 for multiple violations (Class II penalty) for
discharging oil into navigational waters.

There is now also a fine of

up to $25,000 per day of violation or $1,000 per barrel of oil spilled,
unless there is gross negligence or willful misconduct involved, in
which case the penalty is not less than $100,000 per day or $3,000
per barrel of oil spilled.
a fine of $25,000 per day for failure to comply with a
Presidential order concerning removal action.
- a fine of $25,000 per day for failure to comply with the
financial responsibility requirements .
- criminal penalties of $2,500 - $25,000 and one year in prison
for negligent violations, $5,000 - $50,000 and

three years for

knowing violations, and up to $250,000 and 15 years for knowing
endangerment. 3 1

31. OPA 1990, sections 4301 and 4303.
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2. Studies that are required by OPA '90:
OPA '90 mandated thirty-one rules, regulations or studies that
are to be written or undertaken in the next few years.

Some were

to be completed within six months of the signing of OPA '90, others
have no time limit.

Some of these involve setting up procedures for

carrying out provisions of OPA '90,
evidence of financial responsibility ,

such

as

what constitutes

how the assessment of natural

resources damage is carried out, and regulations for obligating the
Oil

Spill

Liability Trust Fund .

Others

include

studies

of the

deepwater ports to assess risks and costs versus regular ports,
whether vessel traffic systems are required or need to be expanded
for

U.S.

ports,

and various construction,

standards for tankers.

manning

and

safety

The full impact of these various provisions

are not known at present, and will not be until the studies are
completed and the regulations written, but the scope of issues that
they deal with promise that the

impact on the oil shipping industry

will be significant and the manner in which the industry operates
will be significantly altered.

3.
agencies:

The

effect

of

Several

OPA

'90

government

on

certain

agencies

will

government
be

directly

impacted by provisions of OPA '90, and others will be effected as
the various regulations and studies mandated by OPA '90 are carried
out.

The President is charged with a number of responsibilities

including being responsible for ensuring clean up operations are
carried out, amending the National Contingency Plan for a worst case
oil

spill,

conduct

reviewing
inspections

state and
of

oil

local oil

spill
15

spill contingency plans,

removal

equipment,

designate

inspections of oil spill removal equipment, designate procedures for
obligating money from the Oil Spill Fund, and making adjustments to
the liability limits.

The Administrator of the EPA and the Secretary

of Transportation, as noted earlier, have the authority to bring civil
and criminal charges against a discharger of oil.

NOAA is to

promulgate procedures and regulations concerning the assessment of
natural resource damages.

But by far the agency that is most

effected by OPA '90 is the Coast Guard, as the agent charged to carry
out

many of the

Transportation.

responsibilities assigned

The

regulations and

to the

Secretary of

Act specifically assigned 16 different rules.

guidance to be issued by the

Department of

Transportation, which will be carried out by the Coast Guard, as will
the five reports that were also tasked by OPA '90 to the Department
of Transportation.
such

These include many of the technical regulations

as tanker safety devices, when

tankers may operate on

automatic pilot, the specifics of the double hull requirements, and
where single hull tankers must be escorted by tugs.
under OPA '90 will
amount has

yet

The new tasking

require additional funding, but the

to be

identified

as was

specific

brought out by the

Commandant of the Coast Guard during the FY '91 budget hearings .3 2
He also noted that a Vessel Traffic Service System (VTS) costs $25
- $30 million each, and none had yet been funded .3 3

The fear that

3~tIS. Congress~ House. Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Coas.t Guard ~nd
Navigation Sub-Committee, Coast Guard Budget - Fiscal Year 1991, Heanng, Apnl
1990, pg 69.
33. Ibid, pg 20.

16

the Coast Guard has is that the new tasking it has been given will
not be accompanied by sufficient funding, as was the case with the
direction for the Coast Guard to take a larger role in the drug war,
and the leadership is worried that the resources required to carry
out

these

new

taskings

will

come

at

the

expense

of

other

programs. 3 4
C.

Comparison of OPA '90 to international agreements
Since

OPA

'90

did

not

ratify

current

international

protocols, the question which must be asked is: Has the passage of
OPA '90 helped the international effort or has it undermined the
attempts of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to reach a
widespread agreement on controlling oil pollution? In passing this
legislation, has the U.S. Congress provided visionary legislation that
will lead the rest of the world down a path

resulting in safer tanker

operations worldwide, or has the international shipping industry
been faced with a new, unique standard that will apply to operating
only in the U.S. market and will force the shipowners to make some
hard choices as to whether to continue to service that market?
Could existing conventions and protocols have provided the required
controls to prevent oil spills that Congress sought by passing OPA
'90?

This section is a review of both existing and proposed

international agreements and a discussion as to how effective they
have been in controlling oil pollution.
1. Background

34. U.S. Congress, House, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Coast Guard and
Navigation Sub-Committee. U,S. Coast Guard Aids to Navigation Mission., Hearing,
February 1990, pg 28.
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Since the United Nations was first organized after World War
" there have been attempts to organize an international effort to
The Torrey

control oil pollution, with varying degrees of success.

Canyon disaster in 1967 was a major incentive to

produce more

effective international agreements , and the work continues through
today.

The United States has supported the majority of these

efforts, although there have been disagreements over specifics, such
as the appropriate liability limits for shipowners involved in tanker
accidents. The passage of OPA '90 now takes the U.S. down a
different road than the rest of the international shipping community.
OPA '90 contains several provisions that are not part of any current
or proposed international agreements, including · the requirement for
double-bottomed

tankers,

and

the

possibility

of

a

shipowner

involved in a tanker mishap facing unlimited liability for the cleanup
of the accident as well as claims for damages.

2. History of International Conventions
Shipping has long been recognized as an international activity ,
and as shipping activity increased during the twentieth century the
need for international rules and standards to promote marine safety
and prevent pollution also increased .

Prior to World War II several

attempts had been made by both the U.S. and the United Kingdom to
achieve an international convention on controlling oil pollution but
none succeeded.
After

the

creation

of

the

United

Nations

the

need

for

international controls on oil pollution was seen to be even more
pressing, as oil pollution from

both oil spills and

from

routine

discharges (pumping oily bilge water overboard and cleaning oily
18

residues from tanks) was increasing at an alarming rate.

By 1953

more than 250 million tons of oil were being transported annually
(four times the pre-war figure) and over half of the total was crude
oil as opposed to refined petroleum products, which is far more
dangerous to the environment. 35
agency

to

administer

The United Nations created an

international

policy

and

agreements

on

maritime matters through the Convention on the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), which was convened in
1948 and came into force in 1958.

This agency is now known as the

International Maritime Organization (IMO) .

The IMO began with 21

member states and now has 126 states plus one associate member.36
In 1954, since the IMCO convention was not yet in force, the
United Kingdom took the

initiative to convene an international

conference that resulted in the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (OILPOL), the first
international treaty concerning pollution from ships to be adopted.
The primary feature of this convention was the establishment of
zones extending 50 miles from land where the discharge of oil and
oily mixtures in excess of 100 ppm were prohibited. Reception
facilities in ports to accept oily wastes were also required.

The

IMCO was named as the agency to administer the convention as soon
as it came into being.

This occurred in 1958, the same year that the

OILPOL convention came into force . The convention was amended in
1962 to extend the prohibited zones, to prohibit any discharge by

35. "Cleaner Oceans: The role of IMO in the 1990s", IMO News, No.3 1990, pg 6.
.
36. Yoshiro Sasamura, "Implementation of MARPOL 73/78", proceedings of 1985 QII
Spill Conference, Library of Congress, 1985, pg 121.
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new ships of 20,000 tons or more, and extending the application of
the convention to tankers from 500 to 150 tons and above.
OILPOL 54/62 had intended for all tankers to avoid discharge
of oily mixtures into the sea as much as practical and retain them on
board until they could be offloaded in port to a reception facility.
Unfortunately,

masters of ships of 20,000 tons or

more were

allowed, under the convention, to discharge oily wastes at sea if
"special circumstances made it neither reasonable nor practical" to
retain them onboard.

The lack of reception facilities in most ports

gave the masters this justification, and at sea discharges outside of
the prohibited zones were routine.
The tanker industry, recognizing that if nothing was done to
reduce discharges stiffer legislation may follow, and to save more
of the oil for processing rather than being lost overboard, developed
the load-an-top procedure, in which dirty ballast

and tank washing

water are retained on board, the oil allowed to separate from the
water, and the (relatively) clean water pumped overboard while the
oil is pumped into a slop tank. Further separation occurs, and more
water is pumped overboard. Upon arrival at the loading port, fresh
oil is pumped on top of the oil from the slop tank.

Improved refining

techniques were able to utilize this less pure oil, and the industry
estimated that this method saved

1.6 million tons of waste oil each

year from being lost at sea, both to the benefit of the oil industry
and the environment. 3 7

37. "Cleaner Oceans...". pg 7.
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In 1969 the IMO adopted new discharge criteria as amendments
to OILPOL 54.

These amendments prohibited discharges except when

a tanker was: proceeding enroute, was more than 50 miles from land,
the instantaneous rate of discharge did not exceed 60 liters per mile
and the total quantity discharged in ballast voyage did not exceed
1/15,000

of

the

total

cargo

carrying

capacity.

amendments to OILPOL 54 could be met by tankers

The

1969

using the load-

on-top procedure.
In March, 1969, the Liberian flagged tanker Torrey Canyon ran
aground in international waters off the Cornwall coast of England
and 119,000 tons (36 million gallons) of crude oil washed ashore on
the coasts of England and France.

Until this spill occurred the

emphasis of international controls had been on operational pollution.
Now the prospect of a tanker even larger than Torrey Canyon

running

aground anywhere in the world provided the impetus to pass two new
conventions in 1969 .

The International Convention Relating to

Intervention on the High Seas in
established the

Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties

rights of a state to take action to prevent or

mitigate the danger of pollution by oil following accidents

by ships

outside territorial waters, and entered into force in 1975.

The other

act was
Pollution

the

International Convention

Damage

(CLC) .

This

on Civil
placed

Liability for

strict

liability

Oil
for

compensation for damages resulting from an oil spill or discharge on
the owner of the ship from which the oil escaped.

The limits of

liability of the shipowner were placed at $150 per ton of the vessel,
up to a limit of $14 million per incident.
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While it was recognized that these limits were too low to
provide adequate compensation in event of a major spill, it was
feared that higher limits would have prevented acceptance of the
convention by some nations, and then a shipowner would be able to
limit his liability to the residual value of the wrecked ship, which in
case of the Torrey Canyon
that was recovered ($50),38
loss.

could have been

the value of a lifeboat

the rest of the ship having been a total

The International Convention for the Establishment of an

International Fund

for the Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage

(Fund) was passed in 1971 to provide additional compensation to
victims of oil pollution in the event that the
convention were inadequate.

limits of the

CLC

The fund provides up to $35 million per

incident (which can be raised to $70 million by the Fund's Assembly
if deemed necessary) after

the compensation from the shipowner

under the CLC has been exhausted.

The Fund is made up of

contributions from oil importers and entered into force in 1978.

The

U. S., on the grounds that the limits of liability were too low, has
signed but not ratified either the CLC or Fund conventions.

(Note: the

limitation amounts in the conventions are actually expressed in gold
francs, which are converted into Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the basis of 15 gold francs to
one SDR.

The

SDR

are converted into national currencies in

accordance with daily quotations of the IMF.

The original limits of

the CLC convention were 133 SORI ton, up to 14 million SORI
incident. The combined CLC/Fund limits were a total of 45 million

38. "Oil Spill Liability and Compensation". pg 47.
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SDR, since raised to 60 million SDR in 1987.)
The

decade

of

the

1970s

was

the

beginning

of

the

environmental movement, and the IMO met in 1973 to consider a new
convention to replace OILPOL 54/69 .

The International Convention

for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MAR POL 73), was a
very ambitious attempt to reduce both operational pollution and
pollution from accidents, and it was extended to cover all types of
pollution at sea,
substances.

such as sewage, garbage and other harmful

Ratification was slow until more tanker accidents

occurred in 1976 and 1977, including the Argo
December 1976.

Merchant spill in

This led to another conference in 1978 where

MARPOL 73 was

modified by the

Protocol of

1978. The

two

agreements are treated as one and are generally referred to as
MARPOL 73/78.
MAR POL 73/78 entered into force in October of 1983, and
contains provisions that are similar to OILPOL 54/69, but also has
several

points that

pollution.

result in

stronger requirements to

prevent

"Oil" is more strictly defined as petroleum in any form to

include crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined products
(other than petrochemicals); the total quantity of oil that can be
discharged by new tankers is not to exceed 1/30,000 of the total
cargo

(half

of

the

amount

allowed

under

OILPOL

54/69);

a

requirement that oil discharge monitoring and control systems as
well as oily-water separating equipment be used during discharge of
oil; and the creation of "special areas", where no discharge of oil or
oily waste is allowed, which presently are the Mediterranean Sea,
the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden and the
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Red Sea.

Other

requirements

that

were

introduced

in

this

convention included construction and equipment standards such as:
fitting tankers with oil discharge and monitoring equipment; ships
above 400 tons gross tonnage must have oily-water separating
equipment; tankers must have slop tanks of sufficient size to retain
onboard slops (oily residues and wastes) from tank washing, dirty
ballast, and oil residue; the incorporation of segregated ballast
tanks (SST) into new tankers of 20,000 tons or more of sufficient
size so that the vessel will not have to use oil tanks for ballast
except in severe weather conditions;

crude oil washing (COW)

systems in new tankers that use crude oil instead of water to clean
tanks of residue;

and existing tankers of 40,000 tons or more must

be provided with SST, CST (clean ballast tanks) or COW.

Clean

ballast tanks are similar to SST except that SST systems use a
separate piping and pumping system from the oil cargo system while
CST uses the same piping and pumps: hence it is not a true
segregated system.

Other standards limited the size of oil tanks (to

limit the amount of oil spilled if a tank is broken open) and the
placement of SST to protect cargo tanks from rupture in case of an
accident or grounding. 3 9

The United States has ratified MARPOL

73/78.
MAR POL 73/78 went a long way to reduce the risk and
frequency of oil pollution, but did not eliminate it by any means as
was shown by the continuing occurrence of oil spills, notably the
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Amoco Cadiz spill off the coast of France in March 1978.

Claims in

this case initially were for $2.2 billion but the recent award (which
is still under appeal) was for $85.2
million,40

well in excess of the amounts available to the claimants

under the CLC and Fund conventions.
In May 1984 the IMO adopted new levels of compensation that
would be more adequate in case of a major spill such as the Amoco

Cadiz..

The 1984 Protocol to the CLC convention raised the limits of

liability to 3 million SDR (approximately $4.06 million) per incident
for vessels up to 5000 tons, with an additional 420 SDR ($568) per
ton for each additional ton.

Maximum liability is 59.7 million SDR

($80.8 million) per incident.

The Protocol to the Fund convention

raises

the

maximum

level

of

compensation

under

the

conventions to 135 million SDR ($182.6 million) per incident.

two
The

coverage would rise to 200 million SDR ($270 .5 million) when three
states with a total annual oil receipts of 600 million tons ratified
the treaty. Since the United States alone imported 450 million tons
in 1984, this higher limit would almost certainly apply if the U.S.
ratified the Protocols."

The United States, through the Coast Guard

which is the U.S. representative to the IMO, was a key player in the
negotiations leading up to the 1984 Protocols.

Various attempts

were made by Congress to pass legislation that would have adopted
the 1984 Protocols, but none were ever passed by both the Senate

40

B. Van Hanswyk, "The 1984 Protocols to the International Convention o.n Civil

.

Li~bility for Oil Pollution Damages and the International Fund for Compensation for .0 11
Pollution Damages: An Option for Needed Reform in Untied States Law", The InternatIonal
Lawyer, Summer 1988 , pg 333.
41. Van Hanswyk, pg 325.
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and the House.

Then came the Exxon

reacted with OPA '90.

Valdez

spill and

Congress

The failure of the United States to ratify the

1984 Protocols is a major reason that other countries have not
voted to put them in force until the course that the U.S. will take is
clarified, and the path of OPA '90 is not one that other countries are
willing to follow, so far.

3.

Effectiveness

of

International

Programs

The various conventions that have been passed by the IMO have
had success in reducing the amount of oil that has been discharged
both deliberately and accidently into the oceans of the world, and
have dealt fairly effectively with claims that have arisen from a
number of oil spills .
In 1990, the United Nations Group of Experts on the Scientific
Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP) stated in their report on the
State of the Marine Environment that "without the application of
OILPOL 54 and MAR POL 73/78

an estimated 8 to 10 million tons of

oil would enter the sea directly each year as a result of pumping out
oil-contaminated

tank-cleaning

or

ballast

water.

The

amount

entering the seas due to maritime accidents has also fallen greatly
in recent years thanks to the development of improved standards,
navigational aids, training and watchkeeping and traffic separation
schemes."42
According
Federation

I

to

the

International

Tanker

Owners

Pollution

the number of oil spills at sea has declined in the last

decade from an annual average of 670 events during the first five

42. "The State of the Marine Environment", GESAMP. UNEP, 1990, pg 92.
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years to 173 events over the last five .

The figures for major

accidents (over 5000 barrels or 725 tons) are 20 and seven events
annually for the same periods. 43

A decrease was noted in this

report in both the numbers of accidents and the rate at which they
where occurring.

Lloyd's Register of Shipping showed the number of

serious casualties in tankers over 6000 tons averaged 2.5 per
hundred ships during 1977-1981 but a rate of only 1.8 from 19821986. 44 While a reduction in the rate of accidents does not mean
that less oil is necessarily spilled in a given year, since a few large
accidents can result in a greater amount of oil lost than a larger
number of small spills would

and the large spills, by their very size

would cause a devastating impact on the local environment, the
reduction is still a good sign that more attention is being paid to
safer tanker operations.
A study conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation and
the Environmental Protection Agency on oil spills in the U.S. during
transport found that for the period 1972 to 1979 vessels had the
lowest rate of amount of oil spilled per billion ton-miles of product
carried per year when compared to pipelines, railroads and highways.
The pipelines had 50 times the spill rate of vessels (due to the large
average size of pipeline spills).45
The IMO reports that the incidence of oil spills at sea over
5000 barrels through 1988 has remained well below the rate of the
1970s, with an annual average of just over 8 per year versus 25 per
43.
44 .
45.
OJ!

Ibid. pg 21.
"State of the Marine Environment", pg 21.
.
R. Walter et ai, "An Analysis of Oil Spills During Transport". ProceedlOgs of 1985
Spj!! Conference, Library of Congress, 1985, pg 157.
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year in the 1970s.46
International agreements

have

not only been

effective in

reducing the amount of oil that is discharged into the ocean, but they
have also dealt fairly swiftly with the
injured by an oil spill.

compensation of victims

Through 1984, the Compensation Fund had

dealt with 20 incidents involving member states; 12 in Japan, one
off Indonesia and the rest in European waters.
had

been partially or entirely settled as of

Sixteen incidents
1984, often within

months of the incident, and the largest payment was in the case of
the Tanio

spill, which involved a spill of 13,500 tons of oil along

the Brittany coast.

The final amount of claims agreed to by the Fund

totalled FFr 350 million ($37.3 million), with 70 per cent payable
under the Fund limits at the time of FFr 245 million.

The first

payment of 61 per cent of the accepted claims occurred within four
years of the

lncldent.s?

By way of contrast, the Amoco

Cadiz

decision on damages awarded was rendered by a U.S. court in 1988,
almost ten years after the spill occurred,48

and payment to the

claimants has still not occurred due to appeals of the judgement in
progress.
In the case of small claims (under $1.5 million), the director
of the Fund can settle the claims without approval of the executive
committee.

The director can also make provisional payments to

mitigate undue financial hardship by victims.

46. • Tanker Casualty Rate Remains Steady", IMO News, No.2 1989, pg 16.
47. R. Ganten, "The Tanio Spill: A Case History Illustrating the Work of the .
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund", Proceedings of 1985 Oil Spill
Conference, Library of Congress, 1985, pg 138.
48. Van Hanswyk, pg 334.
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The Fund can settle claims quickly because it takes an active
role early on when a spill occurs, to ensure proper documentation of
damages is completed and claims are correctly filed, and to work
with the shipowner's insurer so that a quick, fair settlement is
reached.

The Fund also has a small staff so that there are few

bureaucratic delays.

Finally, the Fund has access to technical and

legal experts who ensure proper action is taken both for mitigation
of damages and for submission of claims.

4. Summary
The international conventions that are in force and the IMO
itself have proven to be very effective in reducing the level of oil
pollution in the worlds' oceans and in achieving a significant level of
international cooperation among the maritime nations.

The IMO has

continued to work to combat oil pollution as was evidenced by a new
oil spill treaty that was signed by 90 nations at a conference in
November

1990, which calls for the establishment of national and

regional systems for responding to oil spills and for increased
international cooperation as well as all ships being required to have
contingency plans to deal with oil spills. 4 9

The next conference is

scheduled to take place in Brazil in 1992.
The actions of Congress in ignoring the 1984 Protocols and
passing OPA '90 have contributed to uncertainty in the shipping
industry and have raised the possibility of increasing the risk of oil
spills in U.S. waters as major companies decide the risk of unlimited
liability outweigh the potential gains and leave the market to small
49. J. Guy, "Looking for Solutions, Not Faults", Fairplay, 20/27th December 1990, pg
17 .
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carriers.

Already Shell,

Elf and

boycott the U.S. market 5 0
not implementing the

Petrofina have said they will

and others may follow.

Additionally, by

1984 Protocols, Congress may have lost

access to these funds which would have been funded through oil
company

contributions,

and

which

could

have

been

used

to

compensate losses due to oil spills with the domestic fund as a
backup in case the limits of the international funds were exceeded.
Mr. Bill O'Neil, secretary general of the IMO stated the view of
the shipowners quite plainly in a recent article in Eairglay:
are

not wrangling

about standards.

All

they

want

"Owners
is

equal

application worldwide." A further point to consider is that if the U.S.
imposes

restrictions and

requirements on tankers that wish to

operate from U.S . ports, what is to prevent another country from
imposing restrictions on U.S. shipping, both tankers as well as other
types of shipping?
Finally,

Dr .

J.

A.

Crowley

listed

the

advantages

and

disadvantages of international conventions in a recent issue of !.MQ
News.

The advantages are: equal degrees of safety for passengers

and crew, regardless of flag; free
Convention requirements are

movement within all ports if

met ; ease of enforcement by port

states since inspections are to Conventions' requirements; greater
expertise and experience available in formulating safety standards,
regulations and procedures; same standards apply to all ships,
allowing predictable behavior, economy of production and reduction
in unfair competition; new designs and innovations can be put to the
50. "Clubs Re-Think Tanker P&I Cover", L10yds Shipping Manager, September 1990.
pg 63.
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IMO for consideration and reactions of Member States; reduction in
costs to Member States in producing legislation and codes of
practice; assurance of respect by ships of Flag States of special
areas

for

schemes;

pollution
and

prevention

facilitation

combating pollution.

of

pu rposes

and

co-operation

in

traffic
such

separation
things

as

Some disadvantages listed by Dr. Cowley are:

Convention requirements depend on consensus and must be followed;
the pace of change of regulations is limited to a Convention's
procedural arrangements and time scale; and a two-thirds majority
of Parties to a Convention are required for an amendment.
Rules and standards relating to maritime safety and pollution
prevention should be discussed, agreed and implemented at an
international level.

As a leading maritime nation, the- United States

needs to be a part of the international shipping community and not
operate as a loose cannon.
III.

Impact

of

OPA

'90

on

the

U.S.

and

world

shipping

industry
A. Costs of Tanker Operations
While transporting oil

by tanker may

effective method over long distances,

be the

most cost-

it is not by any means a cheap

form of transportation to operate, especially for U. S. flag vessels.
As an example, a 200,000 ton tanker cost $90 million to build in the
U.S. in 1977, or $40 million to build in Japan.

Crew costs for an

American crew were $1.7 million a year in 1977, while
crew for the same period cost $450,000. 5 1

51. Shaw et ai, "The Global Environment...", pg 161.
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a Spanish

To these costs have to

be added fuel costs, pilotage and tug fees, provisioning costs, fees
for the agent in each port, wharfage charges, maintenance costs, and
insurance.

With the passage of OPA '90 the limits for liability in

case of an oil spill have increased, and the costs for insurance to
provide coverage for liability in case of an oil spill will certainly
increase to a significantly higher level, although the exact amount
of this new level will not be resolved until OPA '90 has been
adjudicated in the courts as the result of some future incident that
occurs under its' provisions.

More recent data on shipping costs (but

for the period just prior to the passage of OPA '90) based on
inquiries with New York based shipping agents indicate that the
approximate cost of opera.ting a 100,000 ton U.S. flag tanker (with
all of the above mentioned costs and fees included) is $30,000 per
day, and $10,000 per day for a foreign flag vessel.

Vessels employed

in transporting cargo to the Middle East for Operation Desert Shield
were

chartered

at $57,000

per day.

These

figures

are

not

insignificant, and it must be remembered that the world shipping
industry is very competitive, and additional costs are not easily
passed along by shipowners to their customers.

Therefore, the

additional cost of providing the double-hulled ships required by OPA
'90, and the cost of obtaining the liability bond to cover the vessel
in the event of the spill, not to mention the relative ease of proving
negligence under the provisions of OPA '90 which will allow suit to
be filed for the full cost of a spill, may lead many shipowners to
reach the conclusion stated by Professor Nixon of the University of
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Rhode

Island

Department

of

Marine

Affairs 52

that the risk of

operating tankers in U.S. waters is too high and that American oil
companies such as Exxon should get out of the tanker business.

If

this were to occur, American shipping companies with more highly
inspected and regulated ships,

better trained crews and better

maintained ships than many other nations would disappear from the
world shipping industry, causing a large number of secondary effects
such as further decline of the American shipbuilding and repair
industry, an even more serious lack of U.S flag ships to support the
armed forces in event of a conflict,

and the further decline of the

merchant marine as a career for Americans.

This would lead to

further transfer of U.S. flag ships to flags of convenience, with all
of the problems pointed out by Professors Shaw, Winslett and Cross
in their article "The Global Environment".53
In addition to these costs that would be faced by shipowners,
there are the

costs associated with

construction of double-hull

tankers (an increase of approximately ten per cent) that will be
required under OPA '90.

OPA '90 allows double-hull tankers to be

phased in over time, and therefore the construction of these tankers
should not overly onerous to shipowners, but other costs will have
to be allowed for as well.

The direct cost of construction of these

vessels may be as low as approximately five per cent more than the
cost of a single hulled ship54 , but the resulting tankers would be
52. Presentation to the University of Rhode Island Marine Affiars Seminar, October
30, 1990.
53. Shaw et ai, pg 162.
54. Robert J. Stewart, Can Double Bottom Tankers Reduce Oil Pollution?", U,S. Nayal
Institute Proceedinas, June 1990, pg 82.
M
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larger than a single hulled ship with the same cargo capacity, and
therefore these ships would require channels to ports to be dredged
deeper, stronger piers to be built, and more tugs to be used during
docking and undocking.

The advantages of double-hulled tankers

include prevention of oil spills (27 of 30 spills studied by the Coast
Guard would have been prevented by double hulls 55

),

and the smooth

sided tanks that result from the ships' structural members being
located between the hulls as opposed to along the bottom and sides
of tanks in single hull ships, allowing easier

cleaning of tanks and

faster discharge rates as well as more complete stripping of tanks,
resulting in less oil lost during transfer.

Clean ballast tanks can be

located between the hulls, which will not only reduce or eliminate
the amount of oil pumped overboard during deballasting operations,
but will provide more protection in the event of a collision with the
tanks placed along the bottom and the sides of the vessel.

B. How will shipowners cope?
The reaction from the world shipping industry to OPA '90 was
one of shock and dismay, to say the least.

Predictions of mass

withdrawal from the U.S. market, the collapse of the (pick one) oil
industry, shipping industry, marine insurance industry or Western
Civilization as we know it were all

postulated at one time or

another. On the other hand, members of industry such as Douglas
Wolcott, the president of Chevron, has said that Chevron will fully
comply with OPA '90 and will operate as safely as possible in order
to avoid spills. Chevron will (he claims); maintain a top quality

55. Ibid, pg 86.
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owned fleet, reduce spot charter exposures, control crews, and
insist on superior insurance coverage. He also stated that Chevron
will continue to charter vessels, with a strict screening process for
prospective owners.

Of great interest was

his statement that

Chevron would indemnify these charters for the risks of trading to
the U.S.56

Another interesting development is the recent television

and magazine advertisements by Dupont, the owner of Conoco, which
proclaim that they are "pioneering the use of double hull tankers to
help safeguard the environment", despite the extra cost of double
hulls (15% is their estimate) and the
capacity (a 10% loss is claimed).

reduction in oil carrying

Dupont obviously believes that

safety and environmental concern is good for business, along the
same line as the automobile manufacturers who find that consumers
want safer cars and are willing to pay for them.

C.

What

is

the

potential

effect

on

the

American

consumer?
One thing that nearly everyone agrees on is that OPA '90 is
going to increase the cost of transporting oil to the U.S. and that
these costs are going to eventually be passed along to the American
consumer either directly by higher prices or indirectly by higher
taxes.

While this will bring the inevitable outcry against the oil

companies

and

the

government,

the

American

public must be

educated to realize that the price of oil has been relatively flat over
the last decade when corrected for inflation and that the bill must
be paid to have a cleaner environment while at the same time
56. Presentation by Douglas Wolcott to the Connecticut Maritime Arbitrators luncheon,
November 29, 1990.

35

maintaining the standard of living that we have come to expect as
our right as Americans. As consumers of petroleum products, we
must pay a share of the costs as a portion of our responsibility in
demanding these products in the first place.
The requirements of OPA '90 are almost certain to cause a rise
in oil prices directly and indirectly to the consumer due to the
deeply ingrained use of oil and petroleum products in our modern
society.

D. Will OPA '90 really reduce the risk of oil spills?
While OPA '90 will cause more equipment to be bought and
staged in preparation for the next spill and for contingency plans to
be drawn up, there is some question as to whether the coordination
of removal operations will proceed as smoothly as was envisioned
during the drafting of OPA '90. OPA '90 does not clearly designate
the federal government or the discharger as the agent primarily
responsible for removal operations.

Under previous legislation, the

discharger was not statutorily responsible to conduct the removal,
and therefore his removal expenses were considered "voluntary" and
did not apply against the limit of the discharger's liability.57
OPA

'90,

the

immediate"

President

is

directed

to

"ensure

Under

effective

and

removal, and a discharger that fails or refuses to

comply with Presidential orders will face substantial penalties and
increased liability.58

While the government's role has been altered,

and a discharger's removal costs are no longer considered voluntary
so

they

may

be

counted

against

the

overall

liability

of

57. Wagner, pg 583.
58. OPA. 1003(c)(2) and (3); 1004(c)(2)(B) and (C); 4201 (a) and 4301 (b).
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the

discharger,59

it is not clear whether the government has been

placed in a substantially different role as to management of the
removal operation than it was

under the

FWPCA.6o

OPA '90

mandates that under the National Contingency Plan the on-scene
coordinator, the Coast Guard, the national response team, the area
committee representatives and state officials must coordinate their
actions with each other. 6 1

A responsible party trying to respond to

all of these groups will have a difficult time doing so and cleaning
up the oil spill at the same time.

A single agency should have been

given overall responsibility to direct removal operations.
Another

significant question

is

whether

OPA

'90

cause

companies such as Exxon to leave the tanker business and leave the
field to small one ship corporations using older, less seaworthy
vessels that are out to make maximum profits and will have no
assets worth pursuing in the event of another major spill.

Combined

with this is the question of where will a company get the required
certificates

of

financial

responsibility,

as

the

international

insurance groups have stated that they do not intend to issue
certificates for more than the

amounts required

under current

international conventions and the Federal Pollution Control Act. 6 2
Chevron, as noted earlier, has vowed to remain in the business and
avoid catastrophe by doing a better job.

How successful they will be

at avoiding an oil spill and remaining profitable remains to be seen.

59. OPA 1004(a)
60. Wagner, pg 583.
61. OPA section 4202.
62. Anthony B. Clark, "Implications of US Oil Pollution Act 1990", fairplay, 27
September 1990, pg 47.
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E. Will OPA '90 speed up the compensation process?
One

goal

of

OPA

'90

was

to

expedite

the

claims

for

compensation in the manner outlined under international legislation,
so that a similar situation to the Amoco
Valdez

Cadiz case or the Exxon

does not occur where many years pass before victims can be

compensated.

Initially OPA '90 does succeed by providing a

procedure for claims to be filed against the responsible party and
then against the compensation fund.

At this point, however, the

person filing the claim must then choose whether to pursue his
claim additionally among the
that are available.

state, common law or maritime venues

If the claimant does so, these claims have to be

adjudicated to completion before he can receive any compensations
from the fund .

Without preemption of other laws the claims process

is slowed by identical claims being adjudicated in multiple courts.
A single forum should have jurisdiction to resolve all claims so as
to reduce the time and costs of litigation and thereby provide
compensation to victims in the shortest amount of time feasible,
similar

to

the

procedures

used

under

the

International

Fund

Protocols.

IV.

Suggestions to

allow the

shipping

industry to

survive

and still reduce the risk of oil spills
A. Compliance With OPA '90
Up to this point we have seen that OPA '90 may cause
significant increases to the

cost of operations of the oil

and

shipping industries, but the cost of cleaning up after any accidents
is so high and the effects on the environment so pervasive (and still
not totally

known)

the position
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of the

U.S.

government that

prevention of oil spills is cheaper in the long run than cleaning up
after them (and living with the effects) would seem to be the best
course to follow for society as a whole.

While it is feasible to

simply dictate to the oil industry to comply with all provisions of
OPA '90, this may lead to a further reduction in the U.S. merchant
marine industry as companies simply decide it is too expensive to
continue in the shipping business.
achieve

the

desired

reduction

The following ideas may serve to
in

risk

of

oil

spills while

still

allowing shipping companies to remain competitive.

1.

Special ports/handling procedures

Designate certain ports as "oil handling ports".

Some major

U.S. ports , such as Los Angeles/Long Beach, not only handle a large
percentage of oil tanker traffic, but they are also suited to being
utilized as an "oil handling port".

This designation would be given to

strategically located ports that already are

or could be easily

modified to handle large tankers alli1 contain any spill that might
result.

Also, these ports would be located close to refineries to

process the oil.
such a port.

Los Angeles/Long Beach is a perfect example of

Refineries are already located there and the tanker

traffic is already significant.

The harbor can handle very large

ships, is relatively easy to get in and out of, and there already is in
place an inner and outer harbor breakwater.

This last point is

significant because it would allow tankers to wait at anchor safely
inside the outer breakwater while waiting to offload, and if a spill
were to occur it would be relatively easy to contain by closing off
the

entrances through the

breakwaters with oil

booms.

Once

designated as a oil handling port, emergency equipment could be
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staged there so as to quickly respond to any spill.

To encourage

tankers to come to one of these ports the liability bond could be
reduced, which would lower the insurance rates for that vessel; or
high user fees would be charged for a tanker wanting to visit
another port.

The oil could be transported from the refineries via

pipelines or rail, or via barge traffic that would be more closely
regulated than is currently the practice.

By concentrating tanker

traffic to selected ports, oil spill response teams could concentrate
their efforts on these ports, resulting in a higher recovery level.
Since the ports would be built to handle oil spills, and could include
collection sites for oily ballast of the type proposed by Shaw et al 6 3
, environmental damage would be minimized and since the ports
would

be

optimized for tanker traffic could actually

speed

up

turnaround time for the offloading or onloading operation.

2.

Crew

restructuring

Since most oil spills occur near or in the entrance to harbors
or traffic separation zones,

a tanker could be encouraged to utilize

a team of large tugs and a pilot or special master to bring the tanker
in from the entrance to the pier.

Rather than the current practice of

having tugs follow a ship until it is close to the pier with a pilot
providing guidance to the ships' master, the tugs would be made up
to the tanker and would drive it to the pier under direction of the
pilot or special master.

The advantage of this arrangement is that

the pilot, with the local knowledge of the harbor and well practiced
at bringing such large ships in to the pier, would have effective
control with the tugs of the ship at the most dangerous part of the
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voyage and would be ready to respond to any emergency.
large ship into a harbor is no easy matter.

Bringing a

After a long voyage with

the minimum manned ships typical of todays' merchant fleet, a
ships' master can be fatigued and may be prone to mistakes.

The

pilot with his team of special tugs (and perhaps some assistants
with the pilot to help with the navigation) would be able to safely
bring the tanker in to the harbor.
with the

preceding one,

This proposal could be combined

and similar inducements (reduction of

liability premiums if the special team is used, or higher port fees if
they are not) could be offered.
In addition to the above proposal, a close look at the training
and certification of crews needs to be undertaken.

As tanker

companies move toward ever smaller crews, these crews need to be
well trained so as to avoid another disaster like the Exxon

Valdez.

There is a move in this direction on the international front, and the
U.S. needs to ensure that it follows suit. Standards such as are
followed

by the

aviation

industry should

be

implemented

followed, including such areas as crew rest so that an
accident such as the World

Prodigy

and

another

spill, where the captain was

found to be exhausted and distracted by cargo calculationsv- , does
not occur. Time and again, studies have found that prevention is
cheaper than cleanup, and that the one area that is most often cited
as the cause of an accident is human error, either due to inadequate
training or some factor such as fatigue.

3.

Offshore

loading/unloading

platforms

64. Andrea Panciera, "New laws, regulations abound after World Prodigy oil spill",
Providence Sunday Journal, June 23, 1991, pg B-2.
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As an alternative to entering port, with the attendant risks to
the vessel, it may be feasible to utilize offshore oil loading and
unloading systems, such as are in use in the North Sea drilling areas
and off of the Louisiana coast.
Single Anchor Leg Mooring
Platform

The North Sea variants (such as the
(SALM) and the Articulated Loading

(ALP)) have been utilized in up to 530 feet of water 65 and

could be connected by pipelines to shore facilities.

The advantage of

these systems is that the loading and unloading operation could be
conducted

away

from

sensitive

areas.

Unfortunately,

these

facilities would also be located away from the shore and if a spill
were to occur the response time would be increased and containment
of the spill more difficult.
(LOOP)

is located

The Louisiana Offshore Oil Platform

18 miles offshore and

has

been operating

successfully since authorized in 1974, with a capacity of up to 1.4
million barrels/day, which is approximately 15 per cent of total
imports for the U.S.66

The lower risks of an oil spill from the LOOP

system were recognized in OPA '90 by the lower liability limits for
LOOP and the potential for these limits to be lowered even further.
This system will certainly be usable on off of certain types of
coasts, but it should be pursued where feasible as a proven,
practical alternative to bringing a tanker into port.

V. Conclusions
65. R. Curtis Crooke & Lloyd G. Otteman, 1984, "Offshore Oil and Gas Technology
Assessment", pg 229 in USGS Circular 929. Symposium Proceedings; A National
Program for the Assessment and Deyelopment of the Mineral Resources of the U.S.
Exclusiye Economic Zone.
66. U.S. Congress, House, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Coast Guard and
Navigation Sub-Committee, Inyestjgation into Coastal Ojl Spills, Hearing, June 21,
1990, pg 3.
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There is little doubt that the passage of the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 was long overdue and vital to the continued fight against oil
pollution.

Certain of the provisions of OPA '90 need to be amended in

order to provide a more viable program to control oil spills. These
include:

ratification

of

the

1984 Protocols,

with

the

OPA

90

Compensation Fund to act as a backup to the International Fund in
the event of a very large spill that will exceed the limits of the
International Fund and the CLC; designation of a single venue for the
adjudication of all claims, and preemption of the state laws with
regard to liability limits; and to clearly designate a single agency to
be responsible for the removal of an oil spill.

Compliance with OPA

'90 as it now stands by the oil industry is required at least for the
short run, but with some imagination it may be feasible to achieve
the necessary protection from oil spills while at the same time
preventing the American merchant marine and related industries
from facing economic disaster.

As an added benefit, since the U.S.

market is such a dominant force in the world, other nations' tanker
fleets will want to comply with U.S. regulations in order to have
continued access to the U.S. markets.

This will result in more of the

worlds' tanker shipping being built and operated in a safer manner
and reduce the risk of oil spills worldwide,
the

which is definitely

to

benefit of the entire world.
In conjunction with these amendments, a concerted effort has

to be made by the Administration and Congress to address the need
to develop alternative energy sources to oil as well as encourage
conservation of energy use, as there is no way to eliminate spills so
long as we continue to import vast quantities of oil and since the
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U.S. does not have the either potential or proven reserves to satisfy
our ever growing energy requirements, we have to break the oil habit

if we

truly wish

to

prevent

oil

spills.

advertisement in the wake of the Exxon

As

Valdez

the

Greenpeace

spill pointed out

with reference to Captain Hazelwood, "It wasn't his driving that
caused the Alaskan oil Spill. It was yours.".
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